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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
HAROLD SULLIVAN I 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
-v-
JOHN w. TURNER, Warden 
Utah State Prison 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
11363 
The appellant appeals from a denial of a 
petition for a writ of coram nqbis by the 
District court. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant petitioned for a writ of coram 
1 
r.obis. The extraordinary writ was denied by 
the District Court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent submits that the judgment of 
the Fourth Jud ic ia 1 District Court, in and for 
utah county, should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant is presently serving a sentence at 
the State Penitentiary following a conviction 
for issuing a check against insufficient funds. 
Subsequently appellant petitioned the District 
Court for a writ of habeas which was denied. 
Appellant is now appealing that denial to this 
court. 
Appellant now appeals to this court from a 
decision in which he was denied a writ of coram 
nob is by the District Court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO 
GRANT THE WRIT OF CORAM NOBIS AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
2 
In the case at bar, appellant in petitioning 
for a writ of coram nobis fails to show suf-
ficient cause for issuance of the writ. Ap-
pellant fails to allege that the evidence is 
newly discovered and could not have previously 
been discovered by due diligence. Further there 
is no hint that the "evidence" would have 
prevented the rendition of the judgment. The 
petitioner, through the office of the writ of 
coram nobis, is attempting to retry the facts 
as they pertain to petitioner's guilt, after 
petitioner gave an uncoerced plea of guilty 
to the bad check charge. 
Chief Justice Traynor, in People v. Shipman, 
42 Cal. Rptr. 1, 397 P.2d 993 (1965), outlined 
the requirements that must be fulfilled in order 
for the extraordinary writ of coram nobis to 
be granted. They are as follows: 
(1) Petitioner must "show that some 
fact existed which, without any fault or 
negligence on his part, was not presented 
to the court at the trial on the merits, 
and which if presented would have prevented 
the rendition of the judgment." (Emphasis 
added) (Cases cited) 
(2) Petitioner must also show that 
the "newly discovered evidence does not 
go to the merits of issues tried; issues 
of fact, once adjudicated, even though 
incorrectly, cannot be reopened except 
on motion for new trial." (Cases cited) 
3 
(3) Petitioner "must show that the 
facts upon which he relies were not known 
to him and could not in the exercise of 
due diligence have been discovered by him 
at any time substantially earlierthan the 
time of his motion for the writ." (Emphasis 
added) (Cases cited) 397 P.2d at 995. 
Clearly these are very strict requirements, 
the fulfilling of which is necessary, in order 
for the extraordinary writ to be granted. Justice 
Traynor pointed out that it would often be 
readily apparent from the petition and the 
court's own records that the petition for coram 
nobis was without merit and should be summarily 
denied. 
The Utah Supreme court has adopted this same 
general view. ~he writ of coram nobis is avail-
able in a proper case, Neal v. Beckstead, 3 Utah 
2d 403, 285 P.2d 129 (1955); see also Butt v. 
Graham, 6 Utah 2d 133, 307 P.2d 892 (1957). In 
State v. Woodard, 108 Utah 390, 160 P.2d 432 
(1945), the defendant was convicted of grand 
I 
larceny on a plea of guilty. Defendant was 
accused of stealing certain rims, tires and a 
(tube, the value of which was over $50. He 
pleaded guilty and was sentenced by the court 
to an indeterminate term in the State Prison. 
While in prison he concluded that the true value 
of the goods which he had stolen was $48.94, and 
was not in excess of $50 as alleged by the 
complaint of the State. 
4 
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j D2 fendant then petitioned for a writ of 
r,:in! nob is which was subsequently denied. 
appeal this court stated: 
A writ of coram nobis, where available, 
seeks to obtain a review of a judgment 
on the ground that certain mistakes of 
fact have occurred which were unknown 
to the court and to the parties affected, 
and would not have been rendered. (cita-
tions omitted) However, for a party to be 
er.titled to this writ it must appear that 
the failure to present the facts to the 
court was not due to any negligence or 
fault of the party seeking the writ. 
(Emphasis added) 108 Utah at 391. 
This court determined that the true value 
uld have been discovered with very little 
fort on the part of the defendant, and in-
~ch as the defendant did not exert the 
cessary effort to acquire the information he 
s clearly negligent and therefore the lower 
urt did not err in refusing to grant the writ. 
Appellant alleges that the reason he with-
his plea of not guilty by reason of in-
':,it was, he was not aware of the use of or 
ar.ing of, "over-draft credit." This is in-
redible in view of the frequency in which he 
lleged ly used his claimed over-draft credit. 
;:ipellant's Brief at 3, 4, 5) Who would better 
:ow of the appellant's claimed over-draft credit 
r.ar, the appellant himself~ 
5 
rt seems to respondent that the reason 
appellant withdrew his plea of not guilty 
by reason of insanity, was in light of the 
doctors findings, i.e., that appellant was 
mentally competent. The judge as well as the 
appellant's attorney were well aware of the 
doctors findings and the defense was severely 
weaked by the findings of mental competency. 
Petitioner would have us reopen and retry 
his case on grounds that he allegedly has 
evidence which might bring a different result 
with reference to his conviction. It seems 
very clear that appellant was aware of these 
additional facts or at least could have made 
himself aware of them with very little effort. 
Appellant did not exercise due diligence, nor 
the necessary effort, and is therefore clearly 
negligent. The requirements for the writ have 
not been satisfied and the lower courts denial 
should be affirmed. 
POINT II 
APPELLATE COURT MAY NOT CONSIDER THE ALLEGED 
FACTS OF APPELLANT, CONCERNING BANK RECORDS, 
INASMUCH AS THEY ARE NOT PROPERLY PART OF THE 
~CORD. 
It is well established in this jurisdiction, 
6 
'~c well as others throughout the United States, 
~',at the appellate court looks to the record 
y;lf· It can consider only matters properly 
3 2art of the record. The general rule has 
s22n adopted by this court. In State v. Cooper, 
! ~14 Utah 531, 201 P.2d 764 (1949), appellant 
'0as convicted of indecent assault. The contention 
~nat the trial court erred, was disposed of by 
t.':lis court, in the following language: 
Defendant also asserts that the trial 
court erred in denying a motion for new 
trial on the grounds that the prosecuting 
attorney, in his argument to the jury, 
made improper and prejudicial statements. 
The arguments to the jury by counsel are 
not preserved in the record, and hence we 
cannot say that the trial court abused its 
discretion in denying a motion for new trial 
on this ground. In the recent case of 
Schlatter v. McCarthy, 113 Utah 543, 196 
P.2d 968, 975, we said: 
"Since the arguments of counsel were 
not preserved in the record, we are hardly 
in a position to say that the argument of 
plaintiffs' counsel to the jury was improper, 
and grounds for reversal.' Error will not 
be presumed, nor can we presume misconduct 
on the part of counsel. 
. There is nothing in the record before 
us on which this court could hold counsel 
guilty of improper conduct." 114 Utah at 544. 
This court re-affirmed this rule most recently 
7 
,;1 State v. Rogers, 21 Utah 2d 
10 8 5 0 I (JU 1 y 1 7 I 19 6 8 ) 0 ,-
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P.2d 
Respondent further submits that there is a 
2resumption of regularity as to the proceedings 
;JnJ dee is ions of the lower court. The genera 1 
iaw is stated in 24A C.J.S., Criminal Law, § 1849, 
as follows: 
As a general rule, the appellate court, 
in the absence of a showing in the record 
to the contrary, will indulge all reason-
able, fair, or ligitimate presumptions in 
favor of the correctness or validity of the 
judgment, rulings, findings, or decisions of 
the trial court, and will presume that the 
proceedings had in the progress of that 
cause were regular, legal and free from 
error. Likewise, the presumption is in-
dulged, on appeal, that accused was accorded 
a fair or impartial trial and that official 
duty was performed, or was regularly, or 
lawfully, performed. The record must be 
viewed in the light most favorable to the 
courts rulings' after an accused has been 
convicted on a plea of guilty or after trial, 
the people are not required to assume the 
burden again of establishing that what was 
done was regular, in the absence of evidence 
to the contrary. 
After conviction, all intendments are in 
favor of the people, of upholding the judg-
ment of the t~ial court, and of the regu-
larity of the action and proceedings of the 
court below. All permissible inferences 
must be made in favor of the prosecution. 
8 
rn the case at bar appellant, in his brief 
"~ 0 2aling from a denial for a writ of coram nobis ", t I 
~ites at length, bank records which allegedly 
5 ~0w that he had an understanding with the bank 
co pay his over-draft checks. These bank 
:ecords, however, are not part of the official 
'record. Inasmuch as the appellate court is to 
:onsider only matters properly a part of the 
record, and the bank records are not a part of 
the record, they may not be considered on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent submits that it is readily 
apparent from the petition, and the court's 
o~ records, that the petition for coram nobis 
iis without merit and the relief sought by 
I . 
appellant here should be summarily denied. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
GERALD G. GUNDRY 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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